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Abstract—Honeynet research has become more important as 
a way to overcome the limitations imposed by the use of 
individual honeypots. A honeynet can be defined as a network of 
honeypots following certain topology. Although there are at 
present many existing honeynet solutions, no taxonomies have 
been proposed in order to classify them. In this paper, we 
propose such taxonomy, identifying the main criteria used for its 
classification and applying the classification scheme to some of 
the existing honeynet solutions, in order to quickly get a clear 
outline of the honeynet architecture and gain insight of the 
honeynet technology. The analysis of the classification scheme of 
the taxonomy allows getting an overview of the advantages and 
disadvantages of each criterion value. We later use this analysis 
to explore the design space of honeynet solutions for the proposal 
of a future optimized honeynet solution. 
Keywords—taxonomy of honeynet solutions; honeynet 
solutions; virtual honeynet; design space 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since Clifford Stoll published his experience tracking a 
network hacker in his book “The Cukoo’s Egg” [1], honeypots, 
the tools used for malicious behavior investigation have been 
widely used in a variety of security scenarios. A general 
definition of the term honeypot was proposed by Lance 
Spitzner [2]: a honeypot is an information system resource 
whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource. 
Based on this essential concept of honeypot, many different 
honeypots have been developed and proposed. Every kind of 
honeypot has its own features and advantages, but also has its 
shortcomings. High interaction honeypots can provide high-
level fidelity of the data captured, allowing a deep investigation 
of adversary’s behavior, because they typically use the same 
vulnerable service or software as the real system. But their 
higher cost in term of resources is a problem that limits their 
large-scale deployment. On the contrary, low interaction 
honeypots benefit by their inherent lightweight design, 
facilitating their large-scale deployment. However, due to its 
functionality limitation, low interaction honeypots suffer from 
lack of fidelity. Otherwise, dynamic honeypots can adapt itself 
to the attacker’s network context in real time, but the design of 
a dynamic honeypot is complex, and reaching the right 
performance and response delay could be problematic. 
Meanwhile, static honeypot profits from a more compact 
design at the price of losing the adaptability. Moreover, most 
honeypots focus on server-side security, by analyzing attacks 
coming from clients. But there are also honeypots that can play 
the role of a client-side application, in order to investigate 
malicious software on servers. In addition, some honeypots can 
detect unknown attacks, while some other honeypots even can 
react to those attacks. Some honeypots are used to observe 
interesting traffic while some other honeypots are used to 
monitor the baleful behavior or system activity. 
In summary, the capability of one single honeypot is 
limited. Thus, nowadays, more and more honeypot systems 
focus on the combination of different types of honeypots in a 
honeynet to get an optimized solution. For example, a typical 
honeynet solution is an hybrid system consisting of a 
combination of high interaction and low interaction honeypots, 
which provides a good balance among scalability, 
performance, fidelity and containment. From an attacker’s 
point of view, the honeynet appears to have servers and 
desktop machines, many different types of applications, and 
several different platforms. That is why the term “zoo” is also 
used to name honeynets, as they allow capturing the wild 
hacker in their natural environment. 
In a sense, a honeynet is an extension of the honeypot 
concept. Initially, a honeypot system can be made of an 
individual honeypot, but it also can be composed of a group of 
individual honeypots, considered as a whole system from 
outside. In a narrow sense, the honeynet term refers to Gen I, II 
and III honeynets that are of high-interaction type of honeypot 
system [3], which consists of multiple individual honeypots. 
However, with the development of multiple research projects 
around honeynets, the variety of honeynets proposed does not 
match any longer the narrow honeynet definition, so a 
generalized honeynet definition is needed. 
In this paper, the honeynet term is not limited in its narrow 
definition. A honeynet is a network of individual honeypots 
deployed following a specific network topology. 
Although there are many existing honeynet solutions, a 
honeynet taxonomy that facilitates their classification and 
study has not been already proposed. In this paper, we propose 
such taxonomy of honeynet solutions and apply it to the 
existing honeynet solutions, helping to get a clear outline of 
honeynets architecture, and gaining insight of the honeynets 
technology. The taxonomy can be used by security experts to 
design the appropriate and optimized honeynet solution 
according to its security scenario. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: in section 2, the 
classification scheme of the taxonomy of honeynet solutions is 
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proposed and each class is described in detail; in section 3, the 
new classification scheme of the taxonomy is applied to a 
number of existing honeynet solutions; in section 4, we analyze 
the classification of the honeynet solutions for exploring some 
possible honeynet solutions based on our taxonomy; in section 
5, the state-of-the-art about honeynets is presented; finally, in 
section 6, the conclusions are summarized and some future 
work is suggested. 
II. CLASSIFICATION SCHEME OF TAXONOMY OF 
HONEYNET SOLUTIONS 
A honeynet solution should contain three main capabilities: 
data control, data capture and data collection. 
Data control is a set of measures to mitigate the risk that the 
adversary uses the compromised honeypot to attack other non-
honeynet systems, such as other organization system on the 
Internet. Therefore, outbound attacks must be controlled in 
order to protect the non-honeynet systems. 
The purpose of data capture is to log all the attacker’s 
activity for later investigation. Three critical layers of data 
capture were identified: firewall logs (inbound and outbound 
connections), network traffic (every packet and its payload as it 
enters or leaves the honeynet), system activity (attacker’s 
keystroke, system calls, modified files, etc.). 
Data collection includes all the means needed to securely 
forwarding all of the captured data from distributed systems to 
a centralized secure data collection point. Due to the fact that 
honeypots are themselves insecure systems, the captured data 
must be centralized as soon as possible to an external secure 
system. Besides, centralizing the data in a system makes its 
management easier. 
This section presents the classification scheme of the 
taxonomy of honeynet solutions proposed. Figure 1 illustrates a 
graphical representation of the classification scheme. 
 
Fig. 1. Classification Scheme of Taxonomy of Honeynets 
The classification scheme comprises five main criteria: 
resource level, adaptability level, IP network scope, physical 
placement, and logical deployment. A detailed description of 
each criterion follows. 
A. Resource Level 
Resource level is a criterion used to classify the honeynet 
solutions into physical, virtual, and mixed. 
1) Physical 
A physical honeynet consists of several honeypot systems 
running directly on physical machines following certain 
network topology. Being the honeypots physical means they 
are high-interaction honeypots that can get a high level fidelity 
of data capture, but with a higher resource cost. 
2) Virtual 
A virtual honeynet is made up of virtual honeypots 
following certain network topology. The virtual honeypots can 
be hosted by one or more physical machines. A virtual 
honeynet can be categorized into two types: self-contained 
virtual honeynet and hybrid virtual honeynet. 
Self-contained virtual honeynet – A self-contained virtual 
honeynet is an entire honeynet system deployed onto a single 
physical system. The diagram of a self-contained virtual 
honeynet is showed in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Self-contained virtual honeynet 
The steps needed to create a self-contained virtual honeynet 
follow. Firstly, the host operating system must be installed on 
the physical system. Then, the virtualization software has to be 
installed upon the OS. Lastly, the virtual machines running the 
guest OSs are created, controlled by the virtualization software. 
In this case, the host OS runs the data control and data capture 
functions of the honeynet, acting also as the gateway of each 
guest OS. 
Hybrid virtual honeynet – Contrary to self-contained 
virtual honeynets, in a hybrid virtual honeynet the data control 
and data capture functions are implemented in a physically 
separate machine from the one running the virtual honeypots. 
Fig. 3 exhibits an overview of a hybrid virtual honeynet 
architecture. 
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Fig. 3. Hybrid virtual honeynet 
As can be seen, the first physical device is an isolated 
system that executes the data control and data capture functions 
of the honeynet. The second physical computer is used to hosts 
the virtual machines implementing the virtual honeypots, each 
one running their own operating system. 
3) Mixed 
A mixed honeynet is a honeynet that consists of virtual and 
physical honeypots deployed following certain network 
topology. Mixed honeynets can get a good balance between 
resource efficiency and service fidelity. 
B. Adaptability Level 
Adaptability level refers to the capability of dynamically 
modifying the configuration and topology of a honeynet. From 
the adaptability level point of view a honeynet can be static or 
dynamic. 
1) Static 
Traditionally, security experts determine the configuration 
of the honeynet beforehand and then deploy it. However, under 
some circumstances, the honeynet has to be modified, 
changing honeypots configuration or adding or deleting 
honeypots. A static honeynet is a honeynet without the 
capability of being modified or reconfigured. The main 
drawback of static honeynet is clear: if one honeypot needs to 
be reconfigured, the whole honeynet has to be redeployed. In 
other words, the security experts have to modify the 
configuration, stop the whole honeynet and restart it again. 
Static honeynets are not adequate, for example, for systems 
that require honeynet reconfigurations as a real time response 
to network events. 
2) Dynamic 
Dynamic honeynets are able to change the configuration of 
their honeypots, their topology or adding or deleting honeypots 
dynamically in real-time as a result of a management request or 
a response to a network event. Thus, dynamic honeynets can be 
very useful to create honeynets that are able to react, for 
example, to events triggered by intrusion detection systems and 
reconfigure themselves according to the characteristics of the 
attacker behavior. Dynamic honeynets overcome the 
limitations of static honeynets, allowing their partial 
reconfiguration without needing to restart and redeploy the 
whole honeynet. 
C. IP Network Scope 
The IP network scope criterion of a honeynet indicates how 
the IP addresses are assigned to honeypots. It can be classified 
into two categories: stand-alone and distributed. 
1) Stand-Alone 
In a stand-alone honeynet all the honeypots use IP 
addresses from a common IP network prefix, and they share 
one security toolkit that can capture all of the data from the 
whole honeynet. Some organizations only have one single 
honeynet. However, some others can also deploy several stand-
alone honeynets, but they don’t need to forward the data from 
multiple stand-alone honeynets into a central data server. 
2) Distributed 
A distributed honeynet always covers multiple networks 
concurrently in order to provide a greater ability to capture 
suspicious network events.  This deployment applies only to 
organizations that have multiple honeynets in distributed 
environments. Organizations that have multiple honeynets 
logically or physically distributed around the world have to 
collect all of the captured data and store it in a central location 
by secure approaches. 
D. Physical Placement 
Physical placement indicates the physical location of the 
honeynet. It can be divided into two categories: local and 
remote. 
1) Local 
A local honeynet is a network of honeypots located within 
a physical limited area such as a computer laboratory, office 
building or organization using network media. 
2) Remote 
A remote honeynet does not impose any physical 
placement limitation to the honeypots. It can allow a group of 
physical remote honeypots integrated into one production 
network by tunnel technology, i.e. GRE tunnel, thus the 
honeynet can be located in any place of the world. 
E. Logical Deployment 
Logical deployment refers to the logical relationship 
between the honeynet and the production network. The logical 
deployment strategy can be classified into two categories: 
minefield and shield. 
1) Minefield 
As we all know, landmine will explode upon contact. 
Similarly, honeynets using the minefield strategy passively 
capture data upon interaction. In a minefield deployment, 
honeypots are often logically deployed among production 
systems, possibly cloning some of their real data. In other 
words, the honeypots are logically integrated into the 
production network. Thus, the honeynet is used to handle any 
kind of traffic including regular traffic and intrusion traffic. In 
a minefield deployment, the IP addresses assigned to the 
honeypots are chosen from the unused IP address of the 
production network. 
SAI Intelligent Systems Conference 2015 
November 10-11, 2015 | London, UK 
1005 | P a g e  
978-1-4673-7606-8/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE 
2) Shield 
Using the shield deployment strategy, the network of 
honeypots always acts as a mirror of the production network.  
This strategy allows intrusion detection system (IDS) or 
anomaly detection system (ADS) to investigate the network 
traffic based on destination port numbers. If the traffic is 
interesting, it will be redirected into the honeypot shield, 
protecting in this way the real system from the attack, as well 
as allowing to analyze the attacker behavior.. On the other 
hand, the honeynet shield and the production network are 
coupled, tightly or loosely. Thus the honeynet can reside in the 
same address space of the production network or resides on 
another subnet alongside the production network. It must use 
some approaches to redirect the interesting traffic such NAT or 
GRE tunnel. 
III. CLASSIFICATION OF HONEYNET SOLUTIONS 
A honeynet always takes multiple deception hosts (single 
honeypots), and turns them into an entire deception network. A 
typical honeynet may consist of many facades (because they 
are light-weight and reasonably easy to deploy), some 
instrumented systems for deep deception, and possibly some 
sacrificial lambs (conventional computers running as 
honeypot). Actually, there are several kinds of typical honeynet 
solutions, such as Gen III honeynet, shadow honeypots, hybrid 
system etc. In this section, we will decompose some honeynet 
solutions depending on our classification scheme of taxonomy 
of honeynet solutions. 
A. Gen III Honeynet 
A typical Gen III honeynet is made of a containment 
gateway called Honeywall [4] and computer systems installed 
Sebek/Qebek [5] acting as honeypots controlled by the 
honeywall. The GenIII honeynet architecture is the same with 
the typical GenII honeynet architecture [6] shown in Figure 4. 
 
Fig. 4. An overview of Gen III Honeynet architecture 
The most important tool in Gen III honeynet is the 
honeywall. It is traditionally a layer 2 bridging device 
employed to monitor the unauthorized traffic directed to 
honeypots. It can capture and collect the data and contain the 
attack to avoid compromising other systems from the 
honeypots. 
Resource Level – When the Gen III honeynet was devised, 
it was installed on multiple separate physical machines. As 
such, we classify its resource level as physical. 
Adaptability Level – The whole Gen III honeynet had to be 
configured manually beforehand by a security expert since it 
traditionally uses separate physical machines without the 
capability of dynamic configuration. As such we classify its 
adaptability level as static. 
IP Network Scope – Gen III honeynet traditionally deploys 
on a single production network assigned by the unused IP 
address. Thus, its IP network scope is stand-alone. 
Physical Placement - In Gen III honeynets, the honeypots 
are bridged into the production network. Thus, these honeypots 
can receive the interesting traffic and prevent the production 
systems from being attacked by confusing the adversary. As a 
result, we classify its physical placement as local 
Logical Deployment - The honeypots integrate into the 
production networks and are assigned address from the unused 
IP addresses set. They accept all kinds of input traffic. Thus, 
Gen III honeynet uses the minefield deployment strategy. 
B. Shadow honeypot 
The shadow honeypots [7] based honeynet solution 
segments anomalous traffic from regular traffic and transfer the 
anomalous traffic to a honeynet made of shadow honeypots. If 
the traffic previously marked as suspicious by the anomaly 
detection system is confirmed as an attack by the shadow 
honeypots, it is captured for later analysis. However, if the 
shadow honeypot detects that the traffic classified as an attack 
is legitimate traffic (a false positive), the traffic will be handled 
by the system, and the information about this false positive will 
be used to update and improve the detection system.. 
Figure 5 shows an example scenario using the shadow 
honeypots approach to protect several servers. 
 
Fig. 5. Using shadow honeypots as shield 
Resource Level – The honeynet solution where shadow 
honeypots were deployed did not mention they were using 
virtual machines. We therefore classify its resource level as 
physical. 
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Adaptability Level – Though shadow honeypots can be 
created automatically by the tool, we were not able to devise a 
test case that can dynamically reconfigure shadow honeypots 
in real time. As such we classified its adaptability level as 
static. 
IP Network Scope – Shadow honeypots were placed on a 
single network. As such, the shadow honeypot was classified 
as stand-alone. 
Physical Placement - The shadow honeypots and the 
production servers can be coupled tightly by using the same 
address or coupled loosely by physically deployed alongside 
the production servers. As a result, we classified its physical 
placement as local. 
Logical Deployment - The regular traffic to and from the 
server is not affected, but any suspicious traffic destined to the 
server is instead handled by the shadow honeypots. Thus, we 
classified its logical deployment strategy as shield. 
C. Potemkin 
Potemkin [8] is a hybrid system based honeynet solution. It 
shares similar ideas with Collapsar [9] to provide high-
interaction honeypots to very large address spaces. Figure 5 
presents Potemkim’s hybrid honeynet solution based on a 
honeyfarm. 
 
Fig. 6. A hybrid honeynet solution 
A honeyfarm is a centralized group of honeypots that can 
be located anywhere in the world. The traffic is redirected from 
the distributed capture points to the honeyfarm by using IP 
tunnels (like GRE), in order to centralize data capture and 
facilitate the analysis and the correlation of events. Honeyfarm 
provides many synergies that help to mitigate many of the 
deficiencies of traditional honeypots. For instance, honeypots 
often restrict outbound traffic in order to avoid attacking non-
honeypot nodes. However, this restriction allows honeypots to 
be identified by an attacker. Honeyfarm can be used as 
redirection points for outbound traffic from each individual 
honeypot. These redirection nodes also behave like real 
victims. 
Potemkin consists of a network gateway and VMM (virtual 
machine monitor) based high-interaction virtual honeypots. 
The gateway acts as an agent and takes responsibility to send 
traffic to a honeyfarm server. The routers all over the Internet 
are configured to GRE tunnel an address prefix to the gateway. 
Besides, Potemkin’s gateway also achieves internal reflection 
to contain outgoing attack via redirecting the traffic to a new 
created virtual honeypots. The gateway instructs VMM (virtual 
machine monitor) that runs on each physical server to create a 
new high-interaction virtual honeypot on demand for each 
active destination IP address. The VMM is responsible for 
managing high-interaction virtual honeypots. Thus, if one high-
interaction honeypot is idle, the VMM will destroy it and 
reclaim the resources when instructed by the gateway. 
Because the high-interaction virtual honeypot will waste 
CPU and memory resources of the host when high-interaction 
virtual honeypot has vulnerability but no one exploits it. 
Potemkin uses dynamic creating high-interaction virtual 
honeypots on physical servers to achieve efficient resources 
usage. 
Resource Level – Potemkin uses virtual servers to create 
new high-interaction honeypots on demand for each active 
destination IP address. As such, we classify its resource level 
as virtual. 
Adaptability Level – Because the VMM can create virtual 
honeypots on demand for each destination IP address and also 
destroy it if it is idle. As such we classified its adaptability 
level as dynamic. 
IP Network Scope – Potemkin can allow a group of 
physical remote honeypots integrated into distributed 
production networks by GRE tunnel, using unused IP address 
of distributed production networks. As such, we classified its 
IP network scope as distributed. 
Physical Placement - Since the benefit of GRE tunnel the 
high-interaction virtual honeypots can be put any place. Thus 
the placement of the honeynet is arbitrary. As a result, we 
classify its physical placement as remote. 
Logical Deployment - The high-interaction virtual 
honeypots theoretically accept any kind of input traffic from 
the production network where the virtual honeypots logically 
deployed by GRE tunnel with the unused IP address of the 
production network. As such, Potemkin uses minefield 
deployment strategy. 
D. Anti-Phishing framework based bank honeynet 
Anti-Phishing framework [14] devised a new honeypot 
based way to protect the e-banking system. In this novel anti-
phishing framework there are four different kinds of 
honeypots: phoneypot; phoneytokens; spamtraps; and 
phoneybots. The anti-phishing framework deploys the 
honeypots among the production network and accepts any 
kinds of traffic. The normal honeyed e-banking system runs on 
a physical machine, and a phishing detector is embedded into 
the honeyed e-banking system to automatically detect the 
phishing attack. It has all the functions of a normal e-banking 
system. The honeyed e-banking system always passively waits 
phisher to log in. It can monitor online transactions. The 
phishing detector in the e-banking system can issue an alert 
once it detects a phisher tries to transfer money from a 
phoneytoken to a non-phoneytoken account. 
The phoneybots running on virtual machine are used to 
actively feed phoneytokens to pharmers and phishing malware. 
It mimics real user’s behavior to access the real e-banking 
system in order to confuse the adversaries. The phoneybot can 
execute automatically online transaction with e-banking system 
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from time to time following the average behavior of all bank 
customers. 
Phoneytokens are fake credentials which are used by the 
phoneybots, the spamtraps and the honeyed e-banking system. 
The phoneytoken is just data information that can be accessed 
by the phisher. It is used in online transaction or phishing 
email. It is a face copy of real credential. 
The spamstraps are used to attract phishing emails and 
submit phoneytokens to phishing sites. The framework set up 
virtual machine to run spamtrap. The spamtrap can submit the 
phoneytoken to the phishing site by the human manager when 
it is deceived by phishing email. It running on virtual machine 
mimics real user’s behavior to click phishing link. 
Resource Level –The normal honeyed e-banking system 
runs on a physical machine but the phoneybots and spamstraps 
run on virtual machines. As such, we classify its resource level 
as mixed. 
Adaptability Level – The anti-phishing framework does not 
provide the capability of dynamic configuration. We therefore 
classify its adaptability level as static. 
IP Network Scope – The honeyed e-banking system, 
phoneybots and spamstraps were placed on a single network. 
As a result, we classify its IP network scope as stand-alone. 
Physical Placement - Since all of the honeypots are 
physically deployed in a bank, the physical placement is a 
limited area. As a result, we classified its physical placement as 
local. 
Logical Deployment – The honeypots are deployed among 
these production systems and used to confuse the adversary. As 
such, anti-phishing framework based honeynet solution uses 
minefield logical deployment strategy. 
IV. ANALYSIS FOR EXPLORING THE DESIGN SPACE OF 
HONEYNET SOLUTIONS 
A. Analysis 
In our proposed taxonomy of honeynets, there are five 
criteria. In this section, we analyze the advantages and 
disadvantages of each value of every criterion. 
First of all, from the point of view of the resource level we 
can use physical machine and virtual machine to deploy 
honeynet. Physical honeynets are not used nowadays because 
of their cost in terms of resources needed. Besides, virtual 
machines can provide almost any kind of service a physical 
machine can offer. Even the Gen II and Gen III honeynet 
architectures can be also deployed on virtual machines [10] 
[11]. The main drawback of a virtual honeynet is probably the 
performance of the service provided by the virtual machine. 
The adversary can use several tests to detect the virtual 
honeynet, one of which is to test the service performance. 
Thus, for a virtual honeynet, the security experts must pay 
attention to provide very similar services. 
Secondly, the adaptability level implies that all physical 
honeynets are classified as static honeynets, while the 
capability of dynamic configuration is always provided by the 
virtualization software. But then again, it does not mean that 
any kind of virtualization software or virtualized tool can 
provide the capability of dynamic configuration. Dynamic 
virtual honeynet profit from its flexible configuration and 
deployment has become more and more popular. For example, 
the widely used famous low interaction virtual honeypots 
framework, Honeyd [12] can simulate multiple honeypots 
simultaneously following certain network topology. 
Nevertheless, static honeynet also has advantages. It is easy to 
facilitate a static honeynet and it is suitable for many security 
static scenarios. 
Thirdly, for IP network scope, we have two kinds of 
honeynets, and both of them have strong points and 
shortcomings. Stand-alone honeynet is deployed on a single 
network, thus it is easy to deploy and data collection is not a 
complex task, either. However, it lacks the scalable view of  
multiple networks. Distributed honeynets include honeypots 
across multiple networks concurrently. We know that most 
automated malware can attack a large range of networks but 
some advanced attack only focus on several specific networks. 
Thus the distributed honeynets can provide a global view of 
interesting traffic. The main drawback of distributed honeynets 
is the data collection. It always needs the tunnel technology 
such as GRE tunnel to securely collect the data from different 
honeynets into a central point. It is a complex and resource cost 
task. 
Fourthly, the physical placement is another important 
aspect we must consider. Local honeynet has the placement 
limitation which means the honeypots have to physically put in 
a relative centralized area. Remote honeynet has arbitrary 
physical placement. The remote honeynet can use GRE tunnel 
to integrate into any production network but the service 
performance decrease may arouse the attacker’s suspicions. 
Fifthly, the two logical deployment strategies both have 
their own concern. The minefield honeynets are suitable for 
preventing production honeypot from attack. While the shield 
honeynets are always used to detect unknown attack. 
B. Exploring the Design Space of Honeynet Solutions 
Depending on the analysis of our classification scheme of 
taxonomy, we can try to explore the future honeynet solutions. 
Firstly, the virtualized tool which can provide the capability 
of dynamic configuration and deployment to virtual honeynet 
has a large design space. Because it does not only hit the 
historical requirement since the physical honeynets have been 
out of date, but also can provide the capability of dynamic 
configuration and deployment which are more and more 
important for current network environment. 
Secondly, hybrid honeynet is an appropriate solution for IP 
network scope, since it can cover both the stand-alone 
deployment and distributed deployment. It benefits by the 
combination of low-interaction and high-interaction honeypots, 
thus it can gain a good balance among scalability, fidelity and 
performance. Although there are a number of hybrid honeynet 
architectures [8][9][13], due to the technology limitation most 
of them are static. Thus, the hybrid dynamic honeynet solution 
is still desired to devise. 
SAI Intelligent Systems Conference 2015 
November 10-11, 2015 | London, UK 
1008 | P a g e  
978-1-4673-7606-8/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE 
Thirdly, the honeynet deployment strategy consists of two 
criteria, physical placement and logical deployment. Figure 7 
depicts a coordinate based representation of honeynet 
deployment strategy. 
 
Fig. 7. Honeynet Deployment Strategy 
The coordinate based diagram presents two criteria to 
classify honeynet solutions using different deployment 
strategies. The first criterion is the horizontal axis namely 
logical deployment. The second criterion is the vertical axis 
called physical placement. 
We can use these two criteria to classify different honeynet 
deployment strategies. From the classification of honeynets, we 
know that Gen III honeynets are local minefield honeynets, 
hybrid honeynets are remote minefield honeypots, and shadow 
honeynets are local shield honeynets. But there is rare 
honeynet deployment standing on remote shield, which we 
provide the terminology namely remote shadow honeynets. 
Thus, there is a large design space for remote shadow 
honeynets. Actually, we do have remote shadow honeynets in 
practical security research. Figure 8 shows an example of 
remote shadow honeynet deployment. 
The remote shadow honeynet could be an entire copy of the 
potential victim network in order to keep a high level of 
camouflage and fidelity. The honeynet using remote shadow 
deployment strategy is always a representative honeynet, 
which has all of the characteristics of the potential victim 
network even the same IP addresses. The remote shadow 
honeynet can be used for online attack catch or offline security 
research. 
 
Fig. 8. Remote Shadow Honeynet Deployment 
For online attack catch the functionality is very similar to 
the local shadow honeynets. But it must use a different IP 
network address space and apply a tunnel technology such as 
GRE to redirect the interesting traffic to the remote shadow 
honeynet. 
On the other hand, this representative honeynet can be 
established in an off-line lab environment standing alone from 
the target production network. As such, remote shield honeynet 
deployment means that the honeynet is completely independent 
from the production network implying its high position 
flexibility. The offline research always investigates certain 
impact to the production result from specific harmful traffic. 
Besides, the remote shield honeynet also can be deployed 
in an isolated environment for the attacking and defending 
games and experiments. For example, the CTF (Catch the Flag) 
competition always uses this kind of honeynet. In a CTF 
competition, there are several teams belonging to several 
subnets, and each team has the honeypot systems with the same 
vulnerabilities. The job of each team is to find these 
vulnerabilities, to patch them on their own honeypots but to use 
them to exploit the other honeypots of the opposite team. 
V. STATE OF THE ART 
As stated before, this paper defines a honeynet as a network 
of honeypots following a certain network topology. However, 
some early articles might not agree this definition. For 
example, in the Symantec deception server experience [15], the 
security experts presented three deployment strategies, 
minefield, shield and honeynet. The terminology honeynet, 
however, was used as a kind of deployment strategy. Actually, 
this paper provided a good practical experience about 
honeypots instead of theoretical classification of honeypot 
systems. The deployment strategies proposed in this paper are 
very interesting and can give security experts inspirations. 
The book titled “Virtual Honeypots” [16] describes various 
virtual honeypot systems. The classification scheme of virtual 
honeypots in the book is the interaction level. The authors 
provided many details including the installation and 
configuration guides on a number of low-interaction and high-
interaction honeypots. Moreover, they also described several 
hybrid systems that are very typical honeynet solutions. A 
survey of recent advances and future trends in honeypot 
research [17] investigated around 60 papers after year 2005. 
The survey is quite complete. From this survey the security 
experts can quickly get knowledge of various honeypot 
researches. In this survey, some honeypot researches are 
honeynet solutions. However, the author didn’t distinguish the 
honeynet solutions from the honeypot systems. 
Another famous book from the Honeynet Project called 
“Know Your Enemy” [18] described the development history 
of Gen I, II, and III honeynet. It also presented the concept of 
virtual honeynet in detail. In addition, we also can find the 
research on distributed honeynets. Although the book didn’t 
provide us a theoretical classification of honeynets, we can 
gain affluent knowledge of honeynets from it. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we proposed a new classification scheme to 
create a taxonomy of honeynet solutions. We provided five 
criteria that conform to common honeynet terminology to 
cover the current characteristics of honeynet technology. We 
believe the taxonomy of honeynets is comprehensible to help 
the security experts applying our taxonomy to gain further 
insights into the honeynet technology. 
Furthermore, we analyze the strong points and weaknesses 
of the values in every criterion in order to explore the design 
space of honeynet solution. We found that the virtualized tools 
that can provide dynamic configuration and deployment for 
virtual honeynets have a large design space. What’s more, we 
predict the design of hybrid honeynet solution will keep on 
developing since hybrid honeynets combines both the 
advantages of low-interaction honeypots and high-interaction 
honeypots but offsets the disadvantages on both of them. In 
addition, we discover the remote shadow honeynet deployment 
will become popular since it has practical value. 
In the future, we will apply our taxonomy to more existing 
honeynet solution and explore much more design space of 
honeynets in order to provide optimized honeynet solutions. 
We hope security experts can get benefit from our work. 
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